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INTRODUCTION 
Introductory Remarks 
It is becoming increasingly fashionable to proffer all kind of lessons for a post-apartheid 
South Africa, not the least since the independence of Namibia in 1990 and as the 
geo-political colour of Southern Africa shifts under the new wave of peace initiatives 
throughout its formerly radical territories. Due to the crucial role played by the agrarian 
question in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle and the apparent "agricultural success" and 
related political calm that has marked the first 10 years of transition, as well as due to 
the existence of certain agrarian structural and socio-political "similarities" between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, the former's experience has received post-apartheid 
prognostic attention. The usefulness of such comparative analysis depends, however, 
on the degree to which the Zimbabwean case is adequately portrayed and on an 
appropriate appreciation of the context before 1980 and during the last decade. 
Some Theoretical Considerations 
Perhaps the main problem for comparative research is the fact that post-facto analysis 
of Zimbabwe's agrarian experience exhibits methodological ambiguity over the reasons 
behind the present outcome of a rather "limited" and "unresolved" agrarian question. 
The main lines of argument have tended to be: 
• "Radical" Western scholars have shifted their paradigmatic leanings on the central! ty 
of ideological "maturity" in the wake of disaffection with the limited degree of 
socialist reforms in Southern Africa. Formerly preoccupied with ordaining the 
nationalist movements as revolutionary or "radical" (due to the protracted armed 
struggle and other factors) and hence anticipating socialistic reform, analyses moved 
towards: 
first a dissection of the "underdeveloped" consciousness of Zimbabwe's 
peasantry (Ranger 1983); 
then to the identification of the pristine weaknesses of "cultural nationalism" in 
various ethnographic regions (Ranger 1989), including the over-determining but 
negative effects of the "spirit mediums" during the struggle (La 1987); and 
finally the total rejection of "revolutionary" practice among Zanla forces due to 
their over-reliance on compulsory mobilisation (Kreiger 1988). 
Some Zimbabwean scholars in turn (for instance, I. Mandaza, 1986) instead have 
painstakingly emphasised the nationalist character of the struggle and the constraints of 
a white-settler neo-colonial state, as crucial factors in explaining present limited 
economic reforms. 
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© Yet another wave of scholarship has focused on rational choice and theoretical 
adumbrations providing positive and negative assessments of the Zimbabwean state. 
These tend to be voluntaristic approaches which ascribe to the Government of 
Zimbabwe (GOZ) a large degree of relative autonomy in decision-making during 
the 1980s: 
For some the GOZ has acted in a "statist" fashion side-lining the interests of 
peasants and workers (Cliffe and Stoneman, 1989), bearing little concern for the 
problems confronting the peasantry (Ranger, 1989), using pre-1980 technical 
approaches (Drinkwater, 1988) and neglecting peasant experiences and 
knowledge (Wilson, 1988). While the agrarian strategy and choices made by the 
post-1980 state are indeed crucial, the imperatives on the state to adhere to its 
own agreed upon settlement of the Zimbabwean independence question tend to 
be given footnote and insignificant relevance by scholars, in contrast to the 
prominence that the GOZ has given this factor as a "constraint". 
Rational choice theorists have also neglected broader macro-economic and 
political issues. Additionally, most such works, by isolating land redistribution out 
of context, tend to ignore the effects on state agrarian reform choices of a range 
of critical factors such as: large farmer pressures, lack of donor support for land 
reforms and the economic costs of South African destabilisation, the financial 
costs of defending Mozambique, the costs of reducing South African control of 
Zimbabwe's economy (e.g. state purchases of related investments and transport 
redirection), as well as the costs of the GOZ's preoccupation with social services 
development, 
# Indeed, most writers tend to lack an appreciation of the precise nature of the 
administrative and technical issues within the Lancaster House Constitution 
framework, which created obstacles for agrarian reform, including: 
the role of the independent judiciary, 
the negative tactics of organised farm lobby (overlooked by Bratton 1987 and 
Skalnes 1989), 
the perverse and restraining effects of land-use and environmental ideology 
(Moyo 1989, Weiner 1989), 
black interests in landed property, and 
the use of "counter-reforms" or communal area development as a palliative 
against redistribution and hence cooptation of the "middle-peasantry" (Moyo 
1986). 
# Significantly, the debate has tended to forget the history of the pre-negotiation 
period, if not an outright under-estimation or refutal of the geo-poli tical manoeuvres 
and pressures exerted, in particular by the American and South African states, for 
the type of negotiated settlement achieved, under British "skilful" management. 
Consequently, scholars tend to depreciate the regional stakes involved in the specific 
Zimbabwean "experiment": that is to set up a "multi-racial", "democratic" and 
non-socialist state in settler Africa. In this context, the "lessons" for South Africa 
and Namibia began during the mid-1970s within the "cold war" setting. 
2 
The methodological problem therefore is how to synthesise this wide range of nuanced 
and particularistic interpretations of Zimbabwe's experience in order that meaningful 
learning occurs in Southern Africa. 
Purpose of the Paper 
The aim of this paper therefore is to provide, in the first part, a background to the 
pre-independence context and issues raised prior to the Zimbabwean settlement, 
identifying the nature of the land issue negotiated during Lancaster House and then 
detailing the nature of the Lancaster House agrarian deal. The second part of the paper 
brings forward some critical issues in the Zimbabwean agrarian question, demonstrating 
therein the character and basis of the model in order to provoke the debate on the South 
African agrarian question. Thirdly, the paper presents and assesses land policy issues 
as they have been raised by Zimbabwe's Government in 1991. A final broader 
conclusion on the regional context of Zimbabwe's agrarian question completes the 
paper. 
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ZIMBABWEAN LESSONS OR DOMINO STRATEGIES? 
As far as the agrarian question is concerned, a series of studies have appeared recently 
(e.g. Weiner 1989, Levin 1989, Daphne 1988, etc) providing us with a variety of "lessons" 
and general advice based mainly on, among other experiences, the Zimbabwean 
experience. There are differences among such observers: there are those who see 
Zimbabwe as a positive model to be emulated, especially those who idolise the bi-modal 
agrarian process, while others would consider the experience a "petty-bourgeoisie" 
sell-out. In general, however, most the post-facto commentary has tended to be 
particularistic in its conception of the Zimbabwean model, such that an overview of 
agrarian reform is necessary for a meaningful debate to commence, It is also politically 
useful to take a broad look at Zimbabwe's last 16 years in order to identify some of the 
political and economic interests that may be motivating various parties pushing for South 
Africa's "normalisation". 
Domino Strategies 
By 1980, following the various debates and manoeuvres to produce a "different" 
settlement from the Kenyan experience, whereby the whites should play a more active 
role in the economy, Zimbabwe had assumed a broader status of providing the preferred 
example for political change in Southern Africa. In American circles an influential 
person, somewhat dissatisfied with the low level of proposed American aid to 
Zimbabwe, put it thus: 
The extent that the new government of Prime Minister Mugabe in Zimbabwe can provide 
opportunities for their people, which makes it possible to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the 
African masses while at the same time creating conditions which facilitate the attention of the 
white minority, should significantly strengthen the forces of peaceful change in South Africa. 
But if the Government is unable to satisfy the legitimate aspirations...and if chaos and 
confrontation should erupt it will probably only strengthen the feeling in white South Africa that 
this is what will await them if some form of equitable power-sharing arrangements are established 
there as well (pp. 1-2).1 
Geo-Political Lessons for South Africa 
Some of the more specific lessons Mr Vance and others identified were that: 
© A peaceful, democratic means of transition from white minority rule as opposed to 
war was possible (p. 3), where the "interests of all" are protected (p. 5). 
9 Zimbabwe at the time was not "beholden" to any foreign power (p. 3) and that Mr 
Mugabe "...wants nothing to do with the Soviet Union" (p. 8). 
i C. Vance, "Aid to Zimbabwe": Hearing before the sub-committee on Africa of the Commiitee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96 Congress, Second Session: September 23 1980. 
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• That among alternative paths Zimbabwe had chosen to build on a free democratic 
and mixed economy in the face of the "opportunists and ideologues who would claim 
their day" instead of attempting the "disastrous" by experimenting with a Marxist 
model. It was also felt that the leadership of Zimbabwe had "...a pragmatism and 
African nationalism (which) far outweigh(ed)... (their) Marxism" (p. 12). 
© That "Mr Mugabe's objective (with the many refugees) is to put them on a farm to 
cultivate, but that means the necessary equipment, tractors and other agricultural 
equipment..." are required. That "this experiment of majority rule with the 
protection of the white interests is a very, very bold experiment. The disaster that 
occurred to Mozambique because they threw out the Portuguese—influenced Mr 
Mugabe to realise that it was a great mistake not to give the white population a real 
opportunity and a real basis to be prepared to stay and give their lives to the 
development..." (p. 6). That while he (Mugabe) has a Marxist philosophy, however, 
"...in the administration of Zimbabwe he is a pragmatist and his pragmatism leads 
him to the conclusion that the large ranches should be retained, industry developed 
and private enterprise should be encouraged to enter the country" (p. 6). 
® There was "...an opportunity of seeing he (Mugabe) develop a great country which 
can influence the whole future of Southern Africa... Should it faiL.there is no doubt 
that the Russians can and will move in" (p. 7). Thus it was considered that Zimbabwe 
was "...in a position to use our (American) money in such a way that they can become 
an important factor in helping the development of the whole of that region" (p. 10). 
• That the chances of "...a self-proclaimed Marxist who ultimately would like to 
establish a one-party state...to implement the kind of political and economic 
policies...antithetical to our own values..." was unlikely (p. 8). 
In general, this broad exemplary role prescribed by the US officials for Zimbabwe seems 
to have been understood more in journalistic rather than academic circles. Moreover, 
little has been made of the American admissions that they were providing "token" aid 
to Zimbabwe contrary to the "substantial assistance" implied by American support for 
the Lancaster House negotiations (p. 12) and to the importance they attached to a 
Zimbabwean model to be bequeathed the region. In fact, the "Kissinger billion" peddled 
around 1976 and the "Zimbabwe Development Fund" of 1977 were all part and parcel 
of "building" this model: hence the "...commitment to assist Zimbabwe if a certain result 
was achieved...namely a democratic transition to majority rule ...in ...a pluralistic society" 
(p. 4). 
In this vein it is significant that some American scholars (e.g. Carl Eicher) have extolled 
the positive agrarian model of Zimbabwean reform particularly the institutional benefits 
of technology transfer from large to small farmers. Others, however, extol the positive 
role that the large farmer lobby has had on agricultural policy-making in general, and 
its influence on small farmers (Bratton 1985, Skalnes 1989, etc). In fact, local observers 
have been amazed at the soft line taken by the World Bank/IMF on parastatals in 
Zimbabwe agriculture: as if to suggest that marke ting boards can work well in a bi-modal 
agrarian structure, if only they could cut their deficits. 
Much of the writing on "lessons" for Namibia and South Africa, however, tends to select 
a few specific lessons from the agrarian experience of Zimbabwe, which can be 
replicated or avoided. Weiner, for example, warns about the pervasive nature of the 
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settler farmer ideology, the prospects of a differentiated peasant arising out of 
agricultural growth and the need for democratic forms of large-scale production (1989). 
Levin and Neocosmos (1989) seem to feel that there has been no real agrarian question 
in Zimbabwe (presumably since 1980) given their definition, which allows for such a 
question only where there is extreme overt oppression. Daphne (1989) sees Zimbabwe 
as providing an example of a "popular or revolutionary government" carrying out 
agrarian reforms for "social justice and transformation" and "socialisation of the 
countryside" but limited by "economic and other constraints". Daphne also notes the 
immense support given to peasants and that this succeeded in terms of maize deliveries 
and that the worker-peasant problem was being tackled by land allocation policies. The 
absence of effective rural organisations is cited as a problem for reform (Daphne p. 52), 
while others (Bratton 1986) see the existence of such local organisations in Zimbabwe 
as an asset. 
In general, however, it seems that the "lessons" debate has so far tended to obscure the 
full context of Zimbabwe's agrarian problem and to conceal some critical processes in 
the land reform experience, particularly the broader impact of the limited land reform 
programmes on rural poverty and unemployment. We now reflect on some specific 
issues arising out of the pre-1980 experience. 
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PRE-1980 SOUTHERN AFRICAN GEO-POLITICAL MANOEUVRES 
It will be recalled that by 1976 when the notorious 'Tar Baby" project of Kissinger was 
set in motion, the basic Western political framework was to avert the foreboding 
communist threat. Socialist ideology in Southern Africa had been spawned by the 
continuation of colonialism in the region, and was led by a series of "radical" liberation 
movements. In the wake of the Indochina defeat, US foreign policy was "...characterised 
by the centralisation of authority under this (Kissinger) "warrior professor" and the 
subordination of regional perspectives to a focus on comparative US and Soviet 
willpower" (Rossiter p. 48). The specific policy framework which saw the white regimes 
as being "there to stay" and that any solution had to be sought through them, was 
somewhat also premised on the whites being supportive of a US comparative advantage 
in the region. This policy, contained in the notorious "Option 2",2was intended to 
develop diplomatic rapprochement with the whites and provide them material support, 
and also proposed to increase economic support to the majority-ruled states to soften 
the "diplomatic impact of the new policy" (Rossiter p. 49). By 1976 (24 September), 
Smith under pressure from Vorster, in league with Kissinger, had publicly accepted to 
negotiate a transition to majority role (Ibid, p. 58)., 
During the Carter administration, while overall US goals did not change so much, there 
was a more "aggressive" and "business-like" drive, "using a wider peace-keeping arsenal" 
to develop Southern African resources and supplies to the US (Palmberg 1977). South 
Africa was now more clearly seen as the "banker and industrialist" of the region. South 
Africa was to be persuaded, using the "under-consumption" thesis, to unleash forces of 
change towards black participation in the region's economy, in order to open up the 
market of 200 million, just as the removal of racism in the US had taught (Palmberg, 
1977). The attitude was that American business could benefit from this, in an arena 
where the US was not as influential as the British, Portuguese and South Africans. 
Furthermore, a solution was crucial for access to the mineral supplies of the region, as 
well as to maintain the geo-strategic control that was being lost to the Soviets via Angolan 
and Mozambican independence. 
The net geo-political result of the period up to 1981 was to establish the US as a major 
actor in what was formerly not their zone of influence. This was done by using "...foreign 
programs as an inducement to buy a seat at the table...", and using such a purchase "...as 
ballast for a tilt towards the white-ruled states in other aspects of Southern African 
policy...". Moreover, the USA and South African whites had a "...mutual desire to 
stabilise..." the region against Soviet influence and "...to expand commercial and financial 
relations of US and South African public and private sectors" (Rossiter p. 69). 
Of specific interest to the Zimbabwean agrarian debate, however, is that by the time 
negotiations began, the question of completely buying out the white settlers was 
somewhat over-shadowed by the desire to keep white settlers actively involved. 
(Palmberg 1979). Diplomats had learnt lessons from the former Portuguese colonies, 
2 NSSM; 39 of 1969. 
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where all obstacles to implementing radical change had been removed by settler 
withdrawal. A plan to evacuate white Rhodesians to Bolivia had been exposed and was 
now seen to be counter-productive to Western hegemony. 
But with the former Portuguese territories almost firmly in the "socialist" cradle and the 
Zimbabwean liberation movement now seen to be under the tutelage of the independent 
socialist Mozambique, the need to organise a counter social force became all the more 
important. 
It was contended then that, if Zimbabwean peace was negotiated and American aid 
mobilised to resolve what was seen as a land/settler problem (Palmberg, 1977), then the 
socialist threat could be averted especially if this was backed by other tactical activities. 
It was through this Kissinger initiative that American aid to the sub-region, especially 
to Zambia, was greatly increased. Project hunting techniques by USAID as well as a 
desire to play a donor leadership role in Zimbabwe made it easier to absorb somewhat 
gerrymandered financial allocations in Southern Africa (Rossiter, 1988). 
The "Kissinger billion" was "...to provide for governmental purchase and redistribution 
of large white-owned holdings of fertile farmland, an essential component of national 
reconstruction in a country where the white 4% of the population occupied most of the 
commercially viable land".3 
i 
C. Rossiter: The Bureaucratic Struggle for Control of US Foreign Aid: Diplomacy vs 
Development in Southern Africa, 1988. 
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NEGOTIATING "PRACTICALLY"! 
Having secured the negotiations process, various tactics were deployed by the British 
and Smith regime to foreclose a radical agrarian reform process. Before the actual 
negotiations (between 1978 and 1979) the Muzorewa/Smith regime commenced a 
cooptation process whereby middle and upper class suburban land and related finance 
were opened to blacks, white freehold farmland was also available for purchase, 
wage-foods were made cheaper and a land distribution programme (of a total of 4 
million hectares) was announced. 
The basic negotiating strategy was to table a draft constitution which would secure 
advantage for the whites by granting unhindered citizenship rights to them, including 
the post-UDI immigrants; a Bill of Rights which precluded the expropriation of private 
property; secured freedom of expression, including the creation of separate 
discriminatory schooling; freedom of movement internally and externally - guaranteed 
by dual citizenship; a restricted presidency or executive powers, disproportional white 
parliamentary representation, protection of civil servants' employment and security of 
white pensions.4 On a more broad level, a clause was installed: that 10 years were 
required to amend the constitution. Meanwhile, the independence of the judiciary was 
expected to guarantee white protection. 
Some of the negotiating tactics used included: 
© Speedy attempts to bulldoze certain issues with insufficient data and detail available 
on the part of the Patriotic Front. 
© The threat to remove sanctions, as a carrot for Muzorewa's constituency (both 
Rhodesian and British business interests were targets for this), since many Tories 
believed that sanctions were an instrument supportive of the Patriotic Front. 
© Promises of financial and technical support in the resettlement process: the British 
and Americans being the main promisers. 
® The exaggerated emphasis placed on the need for international recognition of the 
settlement, rather than the evolution of a constitution based on a popularly elected 
assembly. 
® The preclusion of any military integration on armies or "radical changes" in 
Zimbabwe before a free and fair election, as the Muzorewas had confidence they 
could win a significant majority. 
© An appeal to the PF not to rush for land redistribution without adequately studying 
the situation. Resettlement was only to occur when "...carefully prepared and 
implemented to avoid negative effects on production". 
4 Patriotic Front Statement of 8/10/79; RBK, p. 1110. 
9 
® Questions of principle were neutrally presented as a means of protecting every 
person's rights, regardless of the iniquitous basis of ownership of property, resources 
and administrative control. 
• An appeal to retain administrative experience in the future government, to 
guarantee their pensions, positions and citizenship protection. This had pervasive 
and salient implications for the nature of reforms that could be implementable: in 
terms of technique and operations. 
• Ensuring an independence of the judiciary and relieving the Prime Minister of full 
control over the defence forces, police and public service. 
® A wide-reaching principle of compensation for any transgressions of property rights 
and the justiciability of same. 
These tactics were applied at various stages of the negotiations but became more obvious 
during the final phase when the proposed draft constitutions were presented by the 
British. Of interest was the hasty acceptance of the draft proposals by Muzorewa, who 
suggested that the Patriotic Front was being given a negotiating advantage, since the 
moral basis for continuing sanctions did not exist any more. 
In the end, the constitution that carried the day retained most of the entrenched 
positions that the British had proposed. We shall look at this in more detail in the next 
section. 
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LANCASTER HOUSE AGRARIAN DEAL 
Introduction; The 1980 Context 
The settlement in Zimbabwe resulted in the coming to power of a "socialist" government, 
which was restrained from major changes by the Lancaster House Agreement. The 
former Portuguese colonies were all into their efforts of socialist agrarian experiments, 
based mainly on the nationalisation of land and its transfer to state enterprise and 
cooperatives. Well-known forms of destabilisation and counter-insurgency, as well as 
difficulties of a broader economic nature, led to a generally "unsatisfactory" agrarian 
result there. In narrow evaluative terms, many observers felt that either "statism", 
tactlessness and lack of revolutionary consciousness led to a misguided application of 
socialism in Mozambique. The ruling forces were considered to be drunk from their 
victory and oblivious of emerging internal problems due to an over-dependence on a 
narrowly based "vanguardism". Even an unresolved "national question" was belatedly 
cited by friends and foes alike as leading to the Mozambique "catastrophe". The same 
MISTAKES were not to be repeated by a liberated Zimbabwe! 
Lancaster House Constitution Agrarian Restrictions 
Restrictions on agrarian reform were contained in Chapter 3 of Zimbabwe's 
Constitution dealing with "The Declaration of Rights", especially in Section 16 which 
provided that: 
No property of any description or interest or right therein shall be compulsorily acquired except 
under the authority that: 
• requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice of the ini ention to acquire the 
property, interest or right to any person owning the property or having any interest or right 
therein that would be affected by such acquisition; 
• requires that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interests of public safety, public 
order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, the utilisation of that or any 
other property for a purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section thereof, in the 
case of land that is under-utilised, the settlement of land for agricultural purposes; 
• requires the acquiring authority to pay promptly adequate compensation for the acquisition; 
« requires the acquiring authority, if the acquisition is contested, to apply to the General 
Division or some other court before or not later than thirty days after the acquisition for an 
order confirming the acquisition; and 
o enables any claimant for compensation to apply to the General Drision or some other court 
for the prompt return of the property if the court does not confirm the acquisition and for the 
determination of any question relating to compensation and to appeal to the Appellate 
Division, 
This, of course, could only be fulfilled in the context of an independent judiciary. 
Additionally, it was required that the law on acquisition may provide that a court may 
"...in fixing adequate compensation, ignore any reduction in the value of such land, 
interest or right resulting from any unusual or extraordinary circumstances existing 
immediately prior to such acquisition". Even under emergency or disaster it was held 
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that the above provisions could only be contravened where: reasonable notice of 
acquisition was given, affected persons would be enabled to object in writing to such 
acquisition, it would still be required of the acquiring authority to apply for legal 
entitlement within thirty days, enables the General Division to be satisfied that 
acquisition was justifiable in such an emergency or disaster, requires return of property 
when possession in no longer justifiable, prompt payment of adequate compensation for 
possession or for failure to return and/or damage to the property and enablement of 
claimants to apply for compensation. 
Specific provisions for the nature of compensation were also made in respect of "loss of 
ownership or enjoyment of apiece of land or a substantial portion thereof'. This entailed 
unhindered remittability of compensation within a reasonable time for individuals who 
are "citizens of or ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe", as well as for companies or 
shareholders. 
In general, the right to private property was protected even in terms of other laws which 
make provision for THE estates deceased settlement, tax or rates compensation and 
penalties for breach of other laws. Forfeiture for land dereliction was also 
circumscribed. It was, however, accepted that contravention was allowed only for as 
long as was necessary for the purpose of the conservation of natural resources of any 
description or for "...agricultural development or improvement which the owner or 
occupier of the land has been required and has without reasonable or lawful excuse 
refused or failed to carry out". The President's rights in respect of acquisition and 
interests related to minerals or water (underground or public) were also circumscribed 
as to their contravention of the basic provision above. 
These provisions applied to "pieces of land registered as a separate entity in the Deeds 
Registry" only, although "tribespeople" were protected separately elsewhere. The 
Constitution also protects freedom of movement throughout Zimbabwe to the extent 
that any other law makes provision for "...the imposition of restrictions on the acquisition 
or use of land or other property in Zimbabwe", or through restrictions on residence 
within the Tribal Trust Lands of persons who are not tribespeople... for the protection 
of tribepeoples' well-being". It further stipulated that most such restrictions would need 
to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The repeal or amendment of the 
Declaration of Rights was also proscribed in the sense that both would not apply to 
"...the compulsory acquisition of property ...or rights therein...", and in general these 
could only be changed through a constitutional Bill permissible only after 10 years. 
The Lancaster House constitutional agreement expired in April 1990, opening up the 
land policy framework of the GOZ particularly in terms of: 
* 
@ The constraint on the right to nationalise land. 
© The constraint on forms of compensation for land acquired. 
® Generally, the question of rights to private property in land. 
The fact that the GOZ had the option to assert these rights, although certainly not to be 
assumed as a foregone choice, meant that agrarian reforms could be undertaken on a 
less costly and swifter basis. In essence, the revival of the agrarian debate in 1991 was 
a test of how far and in what direction the GOZ would go. 
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One fundamental point about "Lancaster House" is that it is not conceptually new to 
Zimbabwe, while the similarities with Kenya's settlement are striking. The similar 
points are: 
• In both cases the constitutions through an entrenched Bill of Rights underguards 
the sanctity of private property in general, while singling out land for special 
protection, given the settler character of the then "colonies" This protection seems 
to be targeted at the more fundamental protection of capitalist relations: a point 
which the liberation movements agreed to in spite of their socialist or 
Marxist-Leninist principles. The latter point makes Zimbabwe quite different from 
the former Portuguese colonies, as they had no commitment co a mode of production 
other than their espoused ideology. 
® The concepts of landed property in both countries were based on the Torrens 
System, which not only guarantees title in registration but also guarantees the 
"deeds", a fact which makes for the indefeasibility of the solum: This would ensure 
the legal standing of land owners to claim compensation for damage, at a justified 
rate and with immediate payment for land at a considerable percentage above 
market prices (in forex), if and when ownership rights were "taken" away. 
• The settlement allowed for non-racial access to private landed property, setting the 
framework for aspirant black "middle classes" to also acquire private landed property 
- creating at least interest in it and sowing seeds for the desegregation of the 
liberation movements' "interests". 
® The Constitution was agreed upon with promises of financing by the British and 
Americans and supported indirectly through World Bank support of credit schemes: 
a further commitment of the state and "black" agrarian interests to back up the 
constitutional agreement. 
• Moreover, the Constitution, in recognition of previous land tenure legislation and 
acquisition modalities, accepted the dual system whereby 'Tribal Trust Lands" were 
to be held in so-called "communal" ownership, under the trusteeship of chiefs: a 
situation which in Zimbabwe was later changed (1982) to allow for the introduction 
of guardianship by District Councils. 
The land acquisition modalities in Zimbabwe were modified slightly by 1986 to allow 
the GOZ first option to buy land on offer and to acquire land deemed to be 
underutilised, albeit through complicated criteria of measurement of same and a 
cumbersome process of GOZ claims on such lands. 
Such amendments to the Lancaster House constitution, however, continued to pose 
serious difficulties for land transfers during the decade given the aforementioned 
blocked clauses. Thus the land question under the Lancaster House terms has had the 
ideological and legitimising function in its entrenchment of capitalist theory of law and 
development over a 10-year period. 
That is, the constitution was meant to create an environment in w hich private enterprise 
would have the fullest expression: be it for emigrating whites, remaining whites and/or 
emerging black agrarian interests. Land inequities could only be addressed via markets 
through the costly and due legal process. Critically, this process protected all private 
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land owning races, leaving the GOZ with only moral persuasion and political discipline 
(e.g. the Leadership Code) to "limit" land ownership among its "mass" membership. 
So what has been Zimbabwe's experience within these agreed upon constitutional policy 
constraints? The next section addresses this issue within the broader context of agrarian 
reform as opposed to focusing mainly on land redistribution. 
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SOME KEY ZIMBABWEAN AGRARIAN EXPERIENCES: 1980-1989 
The Broad Ideological Framework 
The new socialist GOZ now hamstrung by the Lancaster House Agreement and wisened 
by the "lessons" set out to construct a "mixed" agrarian structural framework: based on 
the tolerance of a variety of "systems of production" ("small" and "large" commercial 
production, peasant/communal production, state farms, out-growers) different land 
tenure regimes (private, state and so-called communal ownership) and the participation 
of both state and private (including foreign) enterprises in marketing (the former of a 
subsidised loss-making outputs distribution and the latter of a profitable inputs 
distribution). Foreign investment, apart from South African capital, was to be welcomed 
although the state would move through a transitional period towards a transformation 
which would increase state ownership of the means of production, increase the 
distribution of land and other resources, promote the role of cooperatives, etc. This was 
summed up in the Growth with Equity strategy. 
Macro-Economic Aspects 
The macro-economic framework was to encourage export-led growth and forex-earning, 
correct and indiscriminate prices for all farmers to stimulate output as a major policy 
instrument, a continuance of the traditional markets structure (access to state credit, 
private finance, services and infrastructure and declining urban food subsidies) with an 
extension (not reallocation) of these to the peasantry. While labour minima and 
practices were to be regulated, the factor of labour substitution (capital intensification 
through machinery imports and local means) was to be unregulated except 
circumstantially - where forex did not permit and land use and/or land markets were to 
be uncontrolled. Much of this was entrenched in the Bill of Rights' limitations to 
nationalisation of land in particular, and reflected a reconciliation posture. 
GOZ expenditures were greatly skewed from the start by large allocations to defence, 
first as part of the demobilisation and integration exercise and then as costs for the 
defence of trade routes through Mozambique. Educational services took up the second 
largest allocation, while a significant capital outlay was made throughout the period on 
either buying out South African-owned firms in various sectors or rescuing closing down 
mines and firms in the first four years and increasing recurrent allocations were targeted 
for drought relief. A range of large social projects also took their share of the Budget. 
Much of this occurred in the context of a rather low economic growth rate following the 
initial consumer-led boom, characterised by minimal private sector investment growth 
with high state absorption of "excess liquidity". Foreign financial flows were lower than 
anticipated, with a level of unfulfilled land acquisition finance promises. Budget 
balancing and comparatively higher consumption-oriented spending became the norm 
for most of the years, while the economy generated employment at levels below the 
population growth rate. 
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Land Policy Issues in the 1980s 
The question of private property in land was, however, to bedevil the state at various 
levels. The rush for land among the emerged and emerging black bourgeoisie (of which 
there are perhaps about 400 in the large category of 1000 plus hectares, and over 8 000 
in small-scale averaging over 150 hectares and the few thousands richer peasants with 
over 10 arable hectares) became the Achilles heel of land policy formulation and the 
pronounced socialist ethic (Leadership Code). The latter by 1985 had recognised 
private landed property rights among leaders but limited them to 50 acres. This was 
despite the fact that such limited rights were now only being thus vested in wealthy blacks 
aggrieved by a sort of racial discrimination in rights to private land which whites had 
enjoyed for the past 90 years. The right to private landed property was, however, widely 
contested among the rich peasantry (many cooperators and individual ly resettled) who 
now claimed insecurity of tenure and disadvantaged access to credit from both state and 
private lending institutions. 
And if private property could be held in LSCF and SSCF areas many could not 
appreciate why settlers had to be tenants to the state or why "master" and other emerged 
farmers in so-called (but hardly) communal land (ownership) areas could not also 
acquire deeds and/or permits for land on which they essentially have exclusive rights -
barring absolute legal control. Moreover, the youth in most land-short areas had now 
limited rights to any land, as did most unmarried women in spite of the age of majority, 
divorce rights and some sort of inheritance rights. The increasing number of landless 
and destitute men and women, most of whom depended on the patriarchic benevolence 
of kin and with scanty chances of wage employment, swelled the potential for communal 
labour abuses. All this contradicted the mixed tenure framework which in practice 
granted access and security to a few - with gross inequalities of land. Even the state 
forests and national parks (vast expanses of land benefiting the state coffers and private 
hunting, tour and poaching operators - in the name of sustained resource management) 
themselves alienated the neighbouring peasantry. 
Resettlement and Peasant Improvement Programmes 
The GOZ purchased at high cost 3 million hectares of mostly marginal land from the 
LSCF, to settle about 52 000 households, constituting 30% of initial targets. This made 
a slight dent on the still unequal agrarian structure, amidst land hunger; with 
approximately 200 000 households living on the extreme margins. Some approximately 
150 000 peasant households in higher potential dryland areas, in the vicinity of LSCF 
infrastructure and services, and with resources for production took advantage of the new 
policy incentives (e.g. access to AFC credit facilities) to produce the acc laimed surpluses 
of maize and cotton. A few more peasants have since produced some tea, sugar, burley 
tobacco, wheat, etc. Productivity of maize and cotton rose, while more recently the 
resettled have begun to produce fair outputs per hectare on previously uncropped land. 
Cumulatively, however, these gains reached less than 30% of the peasantry and would 
require heavy investments in irrigation, credit, extension, infrastructure and technology 
if they are to benefit the landless thousands, assuming they are not resettled on better 
lands. 
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Socialist Projects 
The ruling party's ideology is socialism, based on Marxist-Leninist principles. But its 
practical implementation has been limited to collectives and state farms acquired on a 
willing-seller willing-buyer basis. These constitute less than 5% of land and even less in 
terms of numbers of people involved, and with little preferential resourcing except for 
the state farms. The collectives' efforts were generally unsatisfactory in terms of outputs, 
land utilisation, crop diversity and productivity, management (capacity/effectiveness), 
cohesion and influence on policy and services, until much later when the performance 
of a few improved - a bit too late to counter a rising negative propaganda which saw such 
failure as natural. The fact that state resources and services were minimal and that a 
few donors (some with nebulous experience on collectives) were the mainstay of the 
collectives' resource base - in an unstructured and unprotected process - as well as the 
fact that the recruitment of membership was amongst the somewhat disadvantaged 
(since most of the liberation movements' leading cadres were absorbed in the state or 
private sector) meant that this experiment was tried with the weakest links and least 
investment. Rather, state farms and the middle peasantry received most support, while 
the LSCF retained its structural advantages and generally obtained most of the policy 
edges it lobbied for. 
Financial Redistribution 
Investment in irrigation or other land production-enhancing resources could have 
alleviated the pressures on the peasant land and on state land policy shortcomings, as a 
temporary (15 years) solution. However, such efforts remained minimal with less than 
2% of peasant lands irrigated. They have also been explained away by environmental 
and high overhead costs arguments - as if the alternatives are not politically risky. In 
broad terms, peasant agricultural growth has been financed mainly through the 
expansion of state market facilities, some new transport infrastructure, some credit and 
quite substantially through own savings or remittances, while donors have played a key 
financing role in peasant markets and services expansion. As stated elsewhere, less 
donor finance or state borrowings were used for irrigation or land redistribution, 
concentrating instead on other aspects such as health, drinking water and education. 
A few pilot projects for growers of tea, wheat, tobacco and sugar have also since been 
financed (for less than 3 000 peasants) by state borrowings and private agri-business 
firms. But it is fair to say that the LSCF had benefited immensely also from donor 
funding of milk technology and transport (NORAD and DANNIDA), the bulk of the 
revamped beef marketing, slaughter and disease protection infrastructure (EEC), farm 
machinery commodity import programmes (USAID) - albeit the peasant counterpart 
funds benefit from this) and credit from the AFC (from multilateral financing). 
This suggests that potential benefits to peasants were directed to the already big farmers, 
hence the agricultural credit for its funding absorptive capacity. As earlier stated, the 
agricultural sector has remained one of the lowest recipients of state recurrent (14%) 
and to some extent capital expenditures - more so if we remove food subsidies as a net 
urban consumer benefit. Based on present financing patterns, totally new borrowing 
and grant sources would be required to mount a massive land purchase and peasant 
improvement programme. 
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Local Government, Land and Resources Control 
Any form of political settlement of the agrarian question resulting from negotiations 
would have had to be sold, if not only to the new administration, but also to the local 
communities in their given (or even radicalised) local level power structures and land 
rights ideology. Thus at independence, as during the colonial period and the struggle, 
the nature of local government, forms of rural mobilisation and the context of 
participation in decision-making were crucial. Generally, local administration, land 
access and use management, local financial and labour contributions to development 
and democratic practice and aspirations were critical issues to account for concretely at 
the community level. This, of course, required a clear political programme and 
organised social forces for its implementation. 
Thus the system of local government was itself modified, as part and parcel of an attempt 
to reassign responsibility for land allocation and local level participation in 
decision-making within the rural areas. For six years two separate systems operated: 
one for the LSCF based on its rural councils involving local intensive conservation area 
committees and with a system of finance from assets and services rates payments as well 
as the organised fund-raising of the local Commercial Farmers' Union branch. 
The other was the District Councils of communal areas based mainly on government 
sectoral development grants (schools, water, roads, etc) and a form of household 
tax-development levy which it has been impossible to collect - not surprisingly given the 
low incomes of peasants. People have also been mobilised to contribute in kind through 
labour for the construction of schools and various other projects, e.g. roads, bridges, 
darns, etc. 
Village and ward development committees were created, the former representing 100 
households with the youth and women represented by a member each in the five member 
committees. Chiefs were no longer to play a major role in decision-making except 
eventually in the community courts, while the councils advised by the VIDCOs allocated 
land, thus stripping chiefs of the essential basis of their powers. 
The system seemed, however, to be unable to fully undermine the patriarchal basis of 
society, providing equal decision-making powers to women and youth and an elected 
rather than kinship-based local authority power structure. The chiefs soon received 
renewed and recognised roles in these committees around 1988. Their adjudication 
reigned in the face of a rather limited development of VIDCOs, the conflict-ridden 
councils as well as the general leadership role ascribed to chiefs in the councils and 
committees. Moreover, the youth and women, who were excluded from the land, 
continued to trek to the towns, Main issues of land allocation and GOZ services and 
materials inputs remained within the power frame of the elders, master farmers and 
influential lineage groups; these being also the source of local electoral support 
mobilisation. 
The local leaders continued to build exclusive tenure on the best and larger proportions 
of land and with master farmers continued to lead farmer groups, which received most 
of the available services and to direct the rural allocation of state resources. 
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Thus the local government and social mobilisation formats somewhat reinforced the 
power of traditional and farm modernising local leaders while concentrating on issues 
of GOZ service delivery, land use reorganisation, health and educational information 
and infrastructure building, and the maintenance of order (e.g. with squatters and 
related contraventions) rather than creating any strong and independent agenda for land 
reform or serious policy lobby for the structural re-allocation of national resources. 
Class Formation, Ethnicity and Regional Inequity Issues 
As could be envisaged under a variety of landed property systems, uncontrolled 
limitations on access to private and state credit, a loose Leadership Code and the variety 
of legal protections to access to and use of private property, the variety of class origins 
among leaders, wide differences in land quality and quantity of the Tribal Trust Lands 
and Purchase Areas and the unequal spatial (provincial and ethno-regional) distribution 
of infrastructure and resources potential, a basis for agrarian class differentiation was 
well laid out for the black populace in tandem with the broader LSCF framework. The 
LSCF were differentiated anyhow, mainly between the large estates of local and 
transnational firms vis-a-vis the settler farmers now turning into companies - the latter 
with different land-holding size and enterprise types. The black monied and perhaps 
"connected" groups just before and after 1980 entered the race for commercial farms, 
while others gained from incentives as available. The class of land-owners and secured 
leases have thus increased in numbers and force. These are yet to be well documented 
in terms of their specific class characters. 
The ethno-regional dimension of agrarian class formation has still to be openly 
discussed. On the basis of the spatially unequal land resources and infrastructure 
distribution, which coincides with provisional boundaries containing various social 
groups, there is a general ethno-regional differentiation of class formation. Largely on 
the basis of subjective discourse, it cannot be overlooked that there is, in fact, some 
public perception of ethno-regional inequity in levels of current agrarian and general 
rural development benefits. This derives from the fact that certain regions consistently 
produce more surpluses while others suffer from periodic droughts, have less or more 
land hunger, more or less water resources and so forth. 
These perceived differences in ethnic gains remain, until open discussions and debate 
expose the exact nature, specificity and causes of such differentiation. Needless to say, 
it is and remains feasible for some in the current state of discourse to attribute such 
differentiation mainly to post-1980 political outcomes and to ferment these into a 
problem of the post-independence national ethnic power balancing. 
Encouragingly, there is no clear-cut formalised ethno-regional political party as most 
parties are mixed. But the class character of the extant parties also remains mixed, 
although the tendency seems to be that quite many of the landed blacks are in positions 
of seniority. The white landed classes, on the other hand, were generally CAZ based 
with a few scattered between ZANU-PF, ZUM and as independents. 
19 
Local Government, Land and Resources Control 
Any form of political settlement of the agrarian question resulting from negotiations 
would have had to be sold, if not only to the new administration, but also to the local 
communities in their given (or even radicalised) local level power structures and land 
rights ideology. Thus at independence, as during the colonial period and the struggle, 
the nature of local government, forms of rural mobilisation and the context of 
participation in decision-making were crucial. Generally, local administration, land 
access and use management, local financial and labour contributions to development 
and democratic practice and aspirations were critical issues to account for concretely at 
the community level. This, of course, required a clear political programme and 
organised social forces for its implementation. 
Thus the system of local government was itself modified, as part and parcel of an attempt 
to reassign responsibility for land allocation and local level participation in 
decision-making within the rural areas. For six years two separate systems operated: 
one for the LSCF based on its rural councils involving local intensive conservation area 
committees and with a system of finance from assets and services rates payments as well 
as the organised fund-raising of the local Commercial Farmers' Union branch. 
The other was the District Councils of communal areas based mainly on government 
sectoral development grants (schools, water, roads, etc) and a form of household 
tax-development levy which it has been impossible to collect - not surprisingly given the 
low incomes of peasants. People have aiso been mobilised to contribute in kind through 
labour for the construction of schools and various other projects, e.g. roads, bridges, 
darns, etc. 
Village and ward development committees were created, the former representing 100 
households with the youth and women represented by a member each in the five member 
committees. Chiefs were no longer to play a major role in decision-making except 
eventually in the community courts, while the councils advised by the VIDCOs allocated 
land, thus stripping chiefs of the essential basis of their powers. 
The system seemed, however, to be unable to fully undermine the patriarchal basis of 
society, providing equal decision-making powers to women and youth and an elected 
rather than kinship-based local authority power structure. The chiefs soon received 
renewed and recognised roles in these committees around 1988. Their adjudication 
reigned in the face of a rather limited development of VIDCOs, the conflict-ridden 
councils as well as the general, leadership role ascribed to chiefs in the councils and 
committees. Moreover, the youth and women, who were excluded from the land, 
continued to trek to the towns. Main issues of land allocation and GOZ services and 
materials inputs remained within the power frame of the elders, master farmers and 
influential lineage groups; these being also the source of local electoral support 
mobilisation. 
The local leaders continued to build exclusive tenure on the best and larger proportions 
of land and with master farmers continued to lead farmer groups, which received most 
of the available services and to direct the rural allocation of state resources. 
18 
Thus the local government and social mobilisation formats somewhat rsinforced the 
power of traditional and farm modernising local leaders while concentrating on issues 
of GOZ service delivery, land use reorganisation, health and educational information 
and infrastructure building, and the maintenance of order (e.g. with squatters and 
related contraventions) rather than creating any strong and independent agenda for land 
reform or serious policy lobby for the structural re-allocation of national resources. 
Class Formation, Ethnicity and Regional Inequity Issues 
As could be envisaged under a variety of landed property systems, uncontrolled 
limitations on access to private and state credit, a loose Leadership Code and the variety 
of legal protections to access to and use of private property, the variety of class origins 
among leaders, wide differences in land quality and quantity of the Tribal Trust Lands 
and Purchase Areas and the unequal spatial (provincial and ethno-regional) distribution 
of infrastructure and resources potential, a basis for agrarian class differentiation was 
well laid out for the black populace in tandem with the broader LSCF framework. The 
LSCF were differentiated anyhow, mainly between the large estates of local and 
transnational firms vis-a-vis the settler farmers now turning into companies - the latter 
with different land-holding size and enterprise types. The black monied and perhaps 
"connected" groups just before and after 1980 entered the race for commercial farms, 
while others gained from incentives as available. The class of land-owners and secured 
leases have thus increased in numbers and force. These are yet to be well documented 
in terms of their specific class characters. 
The ethno-regional dimension of agrarian class formation has still to be openly 
discussed. On the basis of the spatially unequal land resources and infrastructure 
distribution, which coincides with provisional boundaries containing various social 
groups, there is a general ethno-regional differentiation of class formation. Largely on 
the basis of subjective discourse, it cannot be overlooked that there is, in fact, some 
public perception of ethno-regional inequity in levels of current agrarian and general 
rural development benefits. This derives from the fact that certain regions consistently 
produce more surpluses while others suffer from periodic droughts, have less or more 
land hunger, more or less water resources and so forth. 
These perceived differences in ethnic gains remain, until open discussions and debate 
expose the exact nature, specificity and causes of such differentiation. Needless to say, 
it is and remains feasible for some in the current state of discourse to attribute such 
differentiation mainly to post-1980 political outcomes and to ferment these into a 
problem of the post-independence national ethnic power balancing. 
Encouragingly, there is no clear-cut formalised ethno-regional political party as most 
parties are mixed. But the class character of the extant parties also remains mixed, 
although the tendency seems to be that quite many of the landed blacks are in positions 
of seniority. The white landed classes, on the other hand, were generally CAZ based 
with a few scattered between ZANU-PF, ZUM and as independents. 
19 
THE NATURE OF WHITE INFLUENCE 
The nature of the post-1980 "white involvement in the economy", as was aimed for prior 
to negotiations, is of particular interest in assessing the Zimbabwean model. The main 
point is that while acceding to some quantitative losses in land, the LSCF had dynamised 
its quantitative participation through gains in the land markets, increased factor 
substitution, land use re-orientation, reinforced control of pricing and market policy and 
resources and the elaboration of its policy lobby and own technical services machinery. 
True to form, the concentration of the better lands among now only 4 500 LSCF farmers 
increased, with those who went into exile having received handsome incomes from 
whole farm sales at market prices. The state belatedly tried to cont :ol both sales to other 
LSCF farmers and the prices by legislating for its right of first purchase, but this was 
rather too late as most of the sceptic sellers had done so in the firs t few years. And due 
to these sales and the existence of the state as a certain and very will ing buyer, land prices 
were constantly on an upward spiral. The state could no longer afford this land 
acquisition enterprise, which was misled by statically estimated hid purchase costings 
and promises of finances by later apprehensive donors. 
Meanwhile, still about 40% of LSCF lands are not tully utilised at all, while EEC beef 
markets and aid have encouraged an extensification of prime lane! use. Environmental 
ideology further justifies extensive land use in the LSCF and on land under resettlement 
as well as exerting land pressure on the peasantry to re-organise land use (demarcations, 
reduced livestock and crop intensities, conservation measures, controlled grazing and 
cropping, etc). And through this ideology of sustainability the state owns and uses about 
14% of the land under national parks which tend to border with tsetse fly-infested areas 
and acts as a buffer for the so-called communal areas. T ie question of land 
extensification through wildlife ranching also began to create new conflicts over the 
aesthic precedence that nature was to take over poor blacks. 
Relatedly, LSCF employment capabilities have yet to return to the ir 1976 levels - a trend 
which they could only achieve with full land utilisation spurred perhaps by land taxes 
and market control, reduced capitalisation tendencies and perhaps labour-absorbing 
cropping and labour incentives or subsidies. These kinds of riarket interference -
inimical to the current structural adjustment frameworks - could only be matched or 
bettered in employment generation by land redistribution. 
It seems that in the final analysis after a few years of specialist lobby and application of 
the technical and administrative skills from "within the state" agrarian and related 
ministries, the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) has consolidated its own lobby 
capacity by utilising most former civil servants. The major loboy focus has been on 
prices, and it still uses the input and output structures of the large farmer. Negotiations 
for forex and input allocations are still carried out much in relation to the LSCF needs 
first, since they are adequately represented on the main agricultural boards, research 
institutions and on various committees, They have an elaborate media machinery in the 
form of special farmer magazines and a prominent section in a leading non-state-owned 
newspaper. In some respects, they have been the main benefickries of donor support 
to agrarian parastatals - since they are the main users of the such services. 
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The CFU has a staff and officers complement of close to 100 organising technically for 
the LSCF on a commodity and issues basis. In some fields their access to technical 
skills for negotiations surpass those of the GOZ, whose salaries are not the best. They 
also have access to private capital, services and skills which make them a difficult match 
on a legalistic basis in almost any sphere of agricultural lobby. This, of course, could be 
balanced by a greater GOZ investment in related skills, research, information and 
administrative capacity - if these were to be applied to a careful assessment of the real 
economic value of the LSCF enterprise. 
Some voices have been organised and heard at the local level, but these have hardly 
been nationally coordinated and when they have been (e.g. by the Association of District 
Councils, the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe, etc.) they tend to be 
ineffectual, playing second fiddle to either the CFU and other urban-based lobbies, or 
to their sectoral ministerial patrons. 
Things have not been always so "hegemonic" for the local elites, the capitalists and the 
state for there have been pockets of resistance in various regions: although these have 
not taken on a scale and intensity that has seriously challenged the rural and national 
power structure to any significant extent. Moreover, the inherited law and other forces 
(various property security schemes, the police, etc.) tend to have been deeply reinforced 
through the incorporation of demobilised ex-combatants and new unemployed youth 
(brigades, support units, etc.) into an effective and well spread property defence system. 
Except for some sporadic so-called dissidence an intact and safe system has thus evolved. 
The so-called squatting and poaching problems have continued unabated in spite of 
forced removals and the use of ex-combatants to police state land resources. Livestock 
rustling, illegal grazing, fence-cutting and other transgressions seem hard to mitigate 
through various means other than the proccurance of mass secured access. 
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THE EMERGING PRE-1991 AGRARIAN POLICY TENDENCY 
Re-introducing Agrarian Reform "Rhetoric" or Policy Shift 
To the surprise and chagrin of some observers, particularly in the media, the second 
quarter of 1989 saw distinctly increased debate on the redistribution of land and 
problems of resettlement in Parliament, speeches by politicians, various seminars, the 
media and new studies. This came after a relatively distinct lull in public debate on land. 
The main issues raised were that more land should be made available by the LSCF, 
through the GOZ, The Financial Gazette (a private sector media "voice") and the LSCF 
generally reacted that land was available on the market, but expressed fears that 
government did not have a coherent "land policy" - especially on how settlers use land 
and fairplay in land acquisition (Fingaz, August 1989). Additionally, they suggested that 
the GOZ was politicking over land during the election year {Fingaz, 1989) at a time when 
its popularity had been waning (Hawkins, Facts, etc, September 1989): as if to say the 
issue was not political anyway. It was also suggested by the CFU that the debates should 
be held in a cool and calculated manner with due consideration given to the interests of 
all {Fingaz, September 1989). 
The question remained, however, whether any meaning could be ascribed to that, flurry 
of debate. Was it a promising activity determined to seize new opportunities or a 
"hot-air-releasing" conjuncture foreboding anticipated demands - from the expiry of 
constitutional constraints? Methodologically, would analysts not be falling prey (as 
before), to relying on, stated policy, speeches and "radical" posturing as a means of 
identifying prospects for revolutionary change? Alternatively, was the future success of 
land reform to be based on the quality of speeches, the legalistic framework of the 
discourse or the level of visible resources which could be applied for a new reforms? 
And, did the discourse in 1989 show any signs of policy shift or continuity of principles 
applied during the 1980s? 
More fundamental was the question: to what extent did the state-led debate adequately 
represent the real social forces struggling for land reform? In the following section we 
assess some of the apparent tendencies in the re-introduced agrarian debate during 
1989. 
Land Redistribution; Policy-Making Dilemmas 
When GOZ in 1989 reaffirmed its desire to get more land from the LSCF, there emerged 
a definitively prescribed "ruling number", albeit not a time-based target, in terms of the 
quantity of land to be acquired and households to be settled. This number, which was 
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also the one targeted in 1982 - a total maximum of 162 000 families requiring a further 
6 million hectares - was then estimated would cost the GOZ Z$600 million (Karimanzirt 
D, Fingaz, August 1989).5 
In terms of the rationale for agrarian reform, it appeared that the GOZ had resumed 
the moral and equity logic, as noted in its desire to acquire land on behilf of the people 
its vision of national interest (President Mugabe, Fingaz, August 1989). There was some 
economic connotation in the rationale, as reflected in growing concern over "...huge 
lands held for speculation..." (Ibid) and about the need to overcome the LSCF:; 
management constraints in using land, and passing it on to those who co uld use and neec 
land, such as the unemployed (Chidzero, Fingaz, August 1989). 
It also seems, however, that morally the issue of maintaining the right < if citizens to owi 
land as private property would be an accepted principle (President Mugabe, Ibid), as i 
has been before - at least in the LSCF areas - even if ceilings on quanti ty owned may bt 
considered. Moreover, land which was then being used would not be the first segmen. 
to be purchased (Ibid), reflecting continuity in the strategy of going tor underutilised 
land. In 1989, the selection of economically strategic land out of ti e whole pool o 
Zimbabwe's land appeared to be less desirable on economic grounds, even if 
administrators raised the need for large blocks of land. 
A third policy debate continuity was the reaffirmation of the principle of paying for land 
on a land market basis, even if legislation would encourage sales, as could be gleaned 
from references to purchasing costs (Ibid, Karimanzira and Mugabe) and the fact tha : 
even the costs had already been worked out. This is of interest because the issue raise, 
by some that the land belongs to the people anyway (e.g. by Nkomo) was not generally' 
accepted by the leadership. These inclinations reinforced the fiscalistic framewor:: 
within which land redistribution had been undertaken in the past: ar approach whic i 
made available finance and immediate returns and outputs to land the determining 
factor as opposed to the broader economic rationale and long-term returns to lan I 
distribution. 
When assessed closely, in terms of the then available 1989/90 budgetary allocations, t 
could be seen that only $14 million had been allocated for land purchase. Even if W.J 
optimistically added 50% of the donor allocations relevant ministries had for lan I 
purchase as well as the GOZ's own total vote of credit (Z$47 million), the grand tote i 
for land purchase amounted to only Z$61 million. These amounts t arely constitute I 
10% of the publicly announced sums required to purchase the require i amount of lam . 
Thus, even with further donor matching funds it would take at least 20 budgetary yeai s 
to acquire land and settle those targeted above. On the basis of own resources and th i 
current pattern of donor funding levels, therefore, it is clear that an ev en slower pace (f 
5 Minister Karimanzira suggested that: The GOZ will try to settle the 75 000 far lilies it had targetei 
for in the current plan period (1986-1990) by 1991 which will bring the total la id transferred to 
peasants to slightly around 7 million covering i grand total of 125 000 families by 1991. The 
balance of families are to be resettled later on 2 million hectares to be acquire d at an unspecific 
date. This process, it seems, will have to be accomplished in stages beginning with the 
resettlement of already acquired but unallocated land (amounting to 500 (XX) hectares) because o 
resource constraints and other difficulties. Tt e emergent policy framework is therefore one of a 
continued slow and cautiously planned land redistribution process. 
6 Nkomo, The Herald, July 1989, and others. 
23 
land redistribution than had so far been experienced, was the most that could be 
realistically expected. 
This could only be achieved by new policies that drastically altered land prices, and new 
levels of sympathetic donor commitments to Zimbabwe's land redistribution needs or 
a new level of GOZ borrowing not specified in that year's Budget. Things could also be 
accelerated if, as was stated then by the President (Fingaz, 1 September 1989) the GOZ 
borrowed from the LSCF itself - by paying later (on as yet unspecified terms) - as it was 
suggested had happened in other land reforms (Kenya, Latin America). It should be 
remembered, however, that Zimbabwe's case was not a tenancy reform case, where 
output would remain the same and that the GOZ had practised whole farm purchasing, 
while people have not up to now been paying for the land (rents or purchase on credit). 
The land acquisition costs, it was assumed, would have to be borne wholly by the state 
unless it changed its land ownership policy. 
During debate some still considered that other support policies (extension, marketing, 
credit, irrigation, etc.) should make up for the peasantry's shortfalls in land transfers. 
However, it was clear that the overall budget for agriculture was nominally lower in 1989 
by Z$89 million, while subsidies were to be further reduced and, parastatals expected 
to be cost-effective especially in their charges for services. At any rate, donors seem to 
be on the run south - to Namibia and even the Lusophone countries - believing that 
Zimbabwe was doing well, so that little new aid would be forthcoming. 
An underlyingly clear thrust in the continuity of GOZ land policy debate was also 
detectable in the legalistic approach suggested: that legislation would have to be passed 
by Parliament where difficulties in land acquisition were encountered. 
The GOZ, interestingly, also made overtures to the LSCF to come forward with land, 
especially underutilised land (President Mugabe, Fingaz, August 1989) while it 
continued to hesitantly consider land taxation (Chidzero, Fingaz, August 1989). More 
recently, the sentiment has been raised that the CFU should set up a fund for land 
purchase, to assist the Government inasmuch as the former colonial master provides 
aid. 
On the implementation of the resettlement programme the GOZ emphasised its 
commitment to a carefully planned process, not as in the heydays of "accelerated" 
resettlement, implying a slow process. More critically, however, the reason given was 
that the relevant ministry lacked resources, as evident in the Budget, particularly the 
stated shortage of planning person power to the tune of less than 50% of requirements 
(Karimanzira, Fingaz, August 1989). Furthermore, planning was to be constrained by 
the need to link resettlement planning to communal area re-organisation planning 
(Ibid), an exercise which all agree is not only technically formidable but politically 
difficult and time-consuming: sharing resettlement planning resources with such an 
effort thwarts the resettlement programme. The GOZ, however, also stated its intention 
to replan first the "accelerated schemes", as they needed to be upgraded since they lacked 
services and infrastructure (Ibid). This simple planning problem, coupled with the not 
so good performance of many schemes, led to greater implementation^ caution and the 
adoption of a more practical pace. 
Another difficult issue for the GOZ was the fact that the current Land Acquisition Act 
provided it with only 30 days to react to land sale offers: this sometimes found the GOZ 
without money or the flexibility to react (Ibid). 
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Altogether, therefore, it seems that both the 1990 elections and t ie expiry of the 
Lancaster House Agreement had spurred major debate by the GOZ on agrarian reform 
policy. The GOZ's public posturing since 1989 had certainly highlighted agrarian 
reform as one of its major preoccupations, competing closely until the first hdf of 1991 
with the economic structural adjustment programme. 
The political high ground that the land issue occupied in 1989 prompted, for instance 
the British Government through its High Commission to request clarif cation on threat, 
of land seizure (BBC, 18 August 1989): the GOZ response through President Mugab 
was that the acquisition of land would be compensated, although he willing-selle * 
element will seize to be a condition. He went on to ask the CFU to cooperate b> 
providing information on amounts of land available for sale, the amounts o ' 
underutilised land, the number of absentee owners and about those Otvning more tha i 
one farm in order, presumably, to set the framework for future land acquisition. Th 
ball was thus thrown back to the CFU by the state on land availabi lity and levels c I 
utilisation in order to do justice to the people's demands. The moral force of the lan 1 
issue, however, did not evoke much compliance from the CFU. The CFU remaine I 
arrogantly adamant by not coming forward >vith concessionary propos lis for 2 new lan I 
policy, their emphasis being a critique of the resettlement programme and the need fc • 
qualified settlers. 
The New Land Policy 
In mid-1990, the GOZ eventually announced a radical land policy in the form of 
principles (see Table 1) and by amending the Constitution to alio v for land bloc< 
acquisitions of up to 5 million hectares, for the GOZ to set land prices, to remove the 
willing-seller-willing-buyer clause, to remove the foreign exc hange paymer t 
requirement on appropriated land and to allow the GOZ more .ime to buy an J 
compensate for land. The GOZ promised to introduce a land tax, to select qualifie i 
farmers, and to review the overall land tenure system. Furthermore, the state defende i 
black capitalist farmers, indicating that it would, in fact, provide them1 vith financial an i 
technical support. Broad undefined principles were also flagged: that. me person woul i 
be allowed one farm, maximum farm sizes would be determined, fore gn own ers woul 1 
have to convert to leasehold with some exceptions, while land use inspection would b ; 
stepped up to ensure full land utilisation. 
The aspects which entailed constitutional amendment, however, recuired that a new 
land acquisition Act be promulgated in order to guide implementatio 1. This has yet t) 
be agreed upon within the GOZ, let alone debated by the public. V oreover, most c f 
the policy issues announced have yet to be fully articulated as forma! policy, such thf t 
comment on them at this stage tends to be speculative. 
The reaction of the CFU was to raise international concern on Zimbabwe's new lan 1 
policy via the Press, and a highly publicised CFU meeting and through a forrm.i 
statement rejecting most of the government's provisions. Press repo 1s suggest that i 1 
the end the CFU had to write a letter to donors at Zimbabwe's structural adjustrner t 
consultative meeting in Paris, disavowing their disagreements with the GOZ, while it s 
understood that Zimbabwean industrialists have not been impressed by the CFU 3 
confrontational attitude towards the GOZ. 
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The problem remains that little open debate is now being held over how to formulate 
the above principles into implementable policies based on an adequate treatment of 
Zimbabwe's specific land problems. It is, therefore, necessary to review the substantive 
issues that underlie the new policy. 
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LAND POLICY ISSUES SINCE 1991 
Introduction 
Having reviewed Zimbabwe's agrarian reform experience up to 1990 and presented an 
overview of the new policy, we now discuss the critical land policy issues underlying 
Zimbabwe's present Land Reform Proposals. Some of these issues arise out of public 
debate, GOZ rhetoric, policy statements and on-going policy dialogues between the 
GOZ, interest groups, experts and financiers. 
Zimbabwe's recent land policy formulation debate has been informed by a variety of 
types of problems, namely: 
Moral and/or normative concerns over equity. 
Land resource use efficiency concerns. 
Land markets efficiency concerns. 
Socio-political balancing: lobby and land demands. 
Implementation and technical efficacy problems. 
Macro-economic cost-benefits of previous land reform. 
These six areas of concern over land, as elaborated briefly below, also translate 
themselves into specific land policy issues as shown in Table 1. 
Moral and Equity Issues 
Historical grievances over land alienation, the political emasculation this entailed and 
the obvious resultant iniquitous distribution of land and access tended to fuel nationalist 
sentiment during the liberation straggle and post-colonial development efforts. 
Furthermore, the extreme poverty and underdevelopment of communal areas and a 
growing unemployment problem suggest a redeeming role to be played by land 
redistribution, given low overall economic growth. 
In this context, the need for justice and equity to be seen to accrue from independence 
have led to various apparently rational policy formulations pertaining to land 
redistribution, such, as: 
@ The necessity for the State to secure legislative rights to acquire land on behalf of 
the people and to redistribute land to the needy. 
© The need to regulate farm sizes: to ensure viability in terms of farm maxima and 
minima. 
® The need to limit the number of farms owned by individuals, 
© The curtail absentee ownership. 
® To exclude foreign ownership. 
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Land Resource Use Efficiency 
Evidence indicates that land under-utilisation has ranged from 30 to 60% of arable and 
grazing land. Therefore, the need to improve land resources use through redistribution 
tended to provide solid technical grounds for reform. This has also been based on 
experiences suggesting the tendency of peasants to use all available land under land 
supply constraints. The observed land unit productivity increase that followed reforms 
elsewhere also justifies the Zimbabwean one. Given maize and cotton production 
growth in communal areas since 1980, the potential for improved land utilisation 
through peasant access to land and support services gave credence to the above 
perception. 
It has also been argued that peasants require less capital and foreign exchange for given 
amounts of output, even if there may be difficulties in the short to medium term for 
peasants producing some specialised crops. Specialised cropping would thus require 
larger production investments to enable peasant responsiveness. 
Additionally, large-scale farmers have been accused of land use "extensification", 
through the use of prime arable land for beef and wildlife. Thus they are sacrificing 
national land use efficiency for micro-enterprise profit optimisation, given existing 
capital constraints to enduse expansion. Game ranching, for instance, secures 
individually large rates of return to minimal capital investments for those farmers who 
already possess large tracts of underutilised land even in the marginal agro-ecological 
zones. 
These considerations have not only strengthened the rationale for land redistribution, 
but have also led to related new policy specifications such as: 
9 Monitoring and regulation of land use. 
© Land taxation as a means of lowering prices and forcing land sales. 
Land Market Efficiency 
It has also been argued that given the settler political economic principles of Zimbabwe, 
which over-protected white enterprise through subsidies and the foreclosure of black 
competition, the land market has been highly inefficient. The issue raised is that a "free" 
private land market, which allowed for sub-divisions but adequately taxed land on the 
basis of economic rent (beyond services levies), would tend to allow for rational land 
use and agricultural resources allocation, and hence a broader participation of blacks in 
the land market. 
This argument arises because there are currently no real land taxes; there exists 
administratively controlled land sub-divisions (meant originally to protect "white" land 
against black tenancy), unregulated land use and the absence of incentives for optimal 
land use. In Zimbabwe, private land acquisition based on expropriation by the whites 
is argued to have served the interests of white farmers rather than to optimise land and 
agricultural resources utilisation. These are seen to have created distorted land markets, 
thus excluding potentially efficient blacks, due to the latter's limited access to capital 
and the white domination of financial markets. Therefore, (a) land taxes, (b) land 
sub-divisions, (c) land price controls and (d) capital gains taxes are seen to be effective 
tools for re-introducing land market efficiency. These, in the long run, are expected to 
lead to the facilitation of land redistribution, through increased land supply rnd lowered 
overall land prices. 
In essence, land market efficiency is also expected to reduce the costs to the state of 
direct land acquisition while also allowing for more private land acquisition as a form 
of redistribution at no cost to the State. 
• > Vi': 
Socio-Political Balancing 
Given the widespread ideological orientations of social forces with the state and in 
society, as well as the existence of so-called "traditional" power socio-political structures, 
socio-political aspects of land tenure and land administration have tended to raise 
specific problems for the land reform process. 
Moreover, the fact that the state inherited land (for forests, parks, urban municipalities, 
and under farm leasehold) and agricultural production enterprises, enabled the 
Government to consolidate its socialist orientation towards state property. This meant 
that Zimbabwe inherited a variety of tenure systems: freehold, state ownership, state 
and private leasehold and so-called "communal tenure". 
To balance various political interests these systems were retained, while resettlement 
augmented the state-held leasehold land, even if settlers did not pay rents. But, in spite 
of demands from kulaks and communal area-based businessmen for freehold land there 
(especially at "Growth Points"), the state has been reluctant to overhaul communal 
tenure on a massive scale. Any attempts to create freehold tenure in communal areas 
would at any rate involve huge administrative costs (surveying, registration etc), apart 
from evoking as yet unclarified sentiments over access to existing communal area land. 
Some have argued that, given land shortages and current land control and inheritance 
practices, there exists a defacto private land ownership pattern in communal areas. They 
also argue that as long as it is a secure tenure there is no need to register private land 
property there. 
Recent accessions to leasehold and finally freehold at Growth Points in communal areas 
have allowed for limited freehold within the so-called "traditional" socio-political 
setting. This concession is linked to the black business advancement lobby which in the 
framework of Zimbabwe's structural adjustment programme perceives land as a critical 
element for access to an already biased finance market dominated by white and foreign 
businesses. 
Altogether, while land tenure is actively under review it is generally believed that a 
mixed tenure pattern is necessary to balance the current diverse socio-political interests 
and demands, given the relatively "blurred" class question among black social forces. 
Indeed, the rise of an ideology of business indigenisation or black economic nationalism, 
as espoused by various political organisations (party, Parliament, the Indigenous 
Business Development Centre and the emerging black commercial farmers 
association), tends to have an omnibus view over property relations in land. There exists 
no rural lobby which clearly calls for full and equitable land distribution. 
A problem still remains over the decentralisation of land allocation within the 
communal areas. The Land Act arrogates overwhelming powers to central government 
over specific land allocation and use decisions (unlike in freehold areas), even though 
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district councils have the stated power to actually allocate land. The removal of land 
allocation powers from chiefs, who are still considered influential in local level 
decision-making, raises doubts on the political feasibility of land policy processes. Given 
certain patriarchal tendencies, moreover, women are seen to be the most disadvantaged: 
particularly widows and divorcees. 
A final yet crucial socio-political aspect, which relates to the technical efficacy of land 
redistribution, is the question of which categories of the poor should gain access to 
redistributed land. It was formerly argued that on social grounds the poorest, 
unemployed, displaced and ex-combatants are the most deserving, given their need but 
also for political balancing purposes. More recently, it has been argued that economic 
criteria need to replace the more social orientation of resettlement, via the selection of 
trained/skilled farmers, suggesting that the pace of land redistribution should be 
regulated by the pace of availability of such farmers and finance. This places the 
emphasis on resettlement as a process of large white fanner "replacement" in production 
terms (crop output mix), rather than as a redistribution problem for equity and social 
justice. 
Implementation and Technical Efficacy 
As quantified later, the performance of the resettlement programme tends to raise 
policy questions concerning the technical efficacy of the programme, particularly its 
implementation. Predicated on the assessment of resettlement gross output and type 
of products, productive land utilisation, settlement costs per capita, debate over the 
technical efficacy of resettlement models (as planned farming systems) as well as the 
financial, administrative and technical capability of relevant institutions, have become 
central issues of contention. 
While a few recognise that planning and currently used models, inherited colonial 
assumptions and politically contrived resource constraints on the peasantry (such as 
maximum land required per household, capital access for inputs and equipment and 
support services), most policy-makers, planners and the public have debated basic 
resettlement assumptions and models as truisms. Therefore, production constraints and 
limitations on resettlement schemes, resulting in its semi-subsistence orientation and 
focus on staple food production, have not been viewed as a problem to be reviewed 
through more appropriate modelling and, requiring new investments on existing 
schemes. A self-ftilfilling prophecy of the inherent inadequacy of small farmers vis-a-vis 
large farmers thus tends to receive technical credence, even if the quality of most 
resettlement land and infrastructure are not conducive to high-value crop production. 
In this vein the main solutions advanced have tended to focus on the "selection" of better 
trained or qualified peasants, rather than on increased investment on schemes. 
Current thinking on new resettlement models tends to favour efforts to evolve livestock 
schemes and to intensify land utilisation through smaller land allocations. Little has yet 
been proposed by Government on irrigated schemes, high-value crop schemes, optimal 
mechanical power-based schemes, and the injection of medium to long-term credit and 
support services. 
Giv^n the limited technical institutional resources available to the State and even 
anti-intellectual attitudes among some elements in Government, insufficient debate or 
alternative resettlement models or farming systems research has resulted. The fev. 
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related experiments by some NGOs and alternative programmes proposed by the new 
local policy researchers are yet to be given serious consideration (if at all), under present 
"budget balancing" macro-economic thinking. 
Centralisation of land reform implementation within two sectoral ministries 
(Agriculture and Local Government), with little clout over macro-economic planning 
and resources allocations, small budgetary allocations to agriculture and limited 
administrative capacities have also imposed severe limitations on land reform. Rather 
than attempt to shift the balance of power within central government planning and 
provoking greater assignment of resources towards land reform implementation, 
Zimbabwean land policy formulation has tended to accept that the pace of land reform 
should conform to the limitations on Central Government administrative capacities. 
Furthermore, rather than decentralising the planning (technical and administrative) 
aspects of land reform, increasing local participation and generating a variety of * 
resettlement models and implementation strategies, the tendency has been to 
concentrate policy decision-making at the central level. Thus the new land policy 
proposals tend only to be debated in perspective at their legislative phase, rather than 
prior to Cabinet approval, nor are the implementation Bills under consideration (e.g. 
Land Acquisition) being openly debated. 
Macro-Economic Aspects 
A final major problem with formulating land policy issues concerns the macro-economic 
positioning and impact of the land redistribution effort. Currently, the approach used 
in costing resettlement ascribes total scheme costs from various sectoral budgetary 
outlays, and land costs to an aggregated resettlement budget. Thus market prices of land 
(a major cost item amounting to about 50% of costs so far - out of $100 million spent), 
are added with social services (schools, clinics, etc. at 30%) and infrastructure and other 
development costs (at 20%) are viewed as a total cost over 10 years of land redistribution. 
While each of these cost elements agglomerated from individual schemes is problematic 
in its own right the total resettlement budget has been utilised to argue that resettlement 
has been a strain on the fiscus. 
It can be argued that the costs of social services and infrastructure applied to 
resettlement would normally be borne by the sectoral ministries of Education, Health, 
Water, Transport, etc, of a post-colonial government anyway, as does occur within 
communal areas. Appropriate financial reporting would ipso facto reduce the real costs 
of land redistribution by appropriate amounts. 
Land purchase costs are problematic, first due to speculative pricing under 
pseudo-monopsonistic conditions, as recognised by the Goverrunent of Zimbabwe, via 
proposals to set prices and, the intention to institute land and capital gains taxes. Such 
high land pricing has buttressed the argument concerning the fiscal costliness of 
resettlement and led to budgetary restraint against land reform. Even donors agreeable 
with market prices, and upon whom financial dependence has been placed for land 
acquisition, have been restrained by these somewhat distorted land acquisition prices. 
Moreover, in the absence of a "real" rural land tax rate, there is no fund from which some 
land purchases and infrastructure development could be financed: Hence, the 
systematic over-dependence of central government on a budgetary allocation process 
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for land acquisition. This has led to the exaggerated emphasis on fiscal constraints to 
land redistribution. 
Additionally, if land redistribution is considered to be the "price" for a negotiated 
independence settlement and ensuing political stability, as well as protecting other 
private investments, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Z$300 million over 10 years 
is a pittance. Would war reconstruction costs and an elaborate security apparatus to 
defend land hunger not cost much more? The trade-offs between land acquisition and 
budget balancing are the static abstractions which distort the land policy debate. 
However, if the above is not convincing, land purchase costs could still (have been), in 
a mixed land tenure system such as Zimbabwe, be partially borne by settlers over 
long-term payment periods using appropriate mechanisms. This issue is germane since 
"qualified" settlers are now to be recruited for resettlement, as invariably these tend to 
be found among the "wealthier" rural population segments. Extending freehold land-
holding to another eight million hectares under the current and proposed resettlement 
schemes would significantly dent the ideological or political character Of Zimbabwe, 
since these lands are already under LSCF freehold, and long-term leases are under 
consideration for the resettlement programme. 
Partly because of both the current resettlement costing approaches used and the 
economies of scale desired in implementing the programme within the existing land 
reform institutional set-up, the issue of large land block acquisition features prominently 
in the new land policy. 
Administrative and technical efficiency, and cost-effectiveness are expected to be 
realised only from resettling people on large designated blocks in contrast to resettling 
them on scattered farms. Furthermore, a top-down administered state resettlement 
scheme requires blocks as opposed to private resettlement initiatives based on scattered 
sub-divisions of unused land. The latter has been rejected due to anticipated land price 
usury, in the absence of a land tax. 
In fact, both block and smaller private land redistribution schemes could be undertaken 
concurrently with large farmer in-filling into sub-divided farms which could more fully 
utilise farms of appropriately 500 ha (in NR II and II). However, the preference for 
large blocks requires immediate large financial outlays, which circularly reinforces the 
fiscalist argument against land reform. Surely, the "pilot" implementation of a 
comprehensive land transfer process with elements of state and settler finance, state and 
locally regulated private administration (involving sub-divisions) of transfers, is 
practicable. Such a process could use land taxes and capital gains taxes as incentives and 
controls for appropriate land supply. Moreover, a pilot scheme could generate new 
ideas for refining the new policy proposals and assist in the design of resettlement. 
A final but publicly compelling macro-economic argument against land reform is the 
expected negative impact of LSCF displacement on output and foreign exchange 
earnings. Assuming that peasants cannot "replace" large farmer output, it is currently 
estimated by the CFU that the country could lose output worth Z$500 million, 
comprising also a foreign exchange loss of ZS450 million in exports, if five million more 
hectares were redistributed. Furthermore, it is estimated that resettling the remaining 
110 000 people targeted would cost Z$1 billion, which is not available in the relevant 
sectoral budgets. Allocating such monies is also expected to have downstream effects 
such as the opportunity costs of alternative investments that could create new 
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employment. Moreover, it is suggeste d that many jobs would be lost from the current 
large farm sector. 
There is, however, lack of agreement over the accuracy of the above estimates, given 
that the broader land policy could lead to fuller land utilisation within those LSCF areas 
not targeted for resettlement, especially through large farm sub-divisions and "in-filling" 
by the newly bought-out large farmers. Furthermore, increased crop production would 
result from settlers in favourable agro-ecological regions. Land reallocations between 
commercial and peasant farmers in practice actually take time to implement and thus 
"losses" (if any) would not be immediate. Over time, resumed large farmer production 
in new areas and new forms of production in future resettlement areas, could actually 
lead to increased overall production. The efficacy of the land transfer exercise would 
therefore be crucial. The macro-economic arguments assume all land transfers and 
resettlement take place at one stroke in time. 
Indeed, a related macro-economic intrigue currently raised is that subjective fears over 
the proposed land designation for purchase, could lead to the lowering of property 
values, leading further to the reduction of bank collateral values resulting in negative 
effects on agricultural credit markets. Private sector economists advancing these 
arguments present little data to support their apparently logical concerns, while we 
would argue that existing monopsonistic financial credit markets enable potential 
political-economic collusions towards realising an artificial "crec it-crunch". 
Moreover, property values are unlikely to fall below their "replacement values", given 
government's use of and stated commitment to use existing real estate practices in farm 
valuations. It can be expected that speculative "market values" of land would decline if 
both a real land tax and a land price-setting regime were put into effect. The need to 
close the gap between "replacement" and "market" values of land per se could be 
addressed first through the land disincentive and capital gains ta< incentive, based on a 
professional land valuation system, which accountably provides indices for both land 
and income tax assessments. While transparent and credible arbitration over land 
pricing may indeed be necessary, it is doubtful whether the courts would realise different 
land value assessments from those derived through an integrated rural tax system 
involving: farm income tax, land tax and property valuation indices. Large farmers will 
have to accept the broader taxation familiar to "free land rnarkei" systems. 
The above issues therefore demonstrate the particularistic framework within which past 
and currently proposed land reform policy have been enacted in post-independence 
Zimbabwe. Essentially, the experience shows how the settler factor has been unable to 
accept free market ideology in its totality, while pushing for the retention of economic 
and property privilege. The state on its part has assigned itself full jurisdiction over land 
policy in a centralised manner, basing its rationale more on nationalism and 
administrative facility, rather than on the popular programmes of the free market. We 
now conclude this paper with an overview of the agrarian question in Southern Africa. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The broad trend in Southern African agrarian change is the move towards expansion of 
"bi-modalism" with some differences in policy instruments used, in the extent of absolute 
land privatisation and the degree of land alienation and deprivation. It also seems that 
most of the states are determined to improve the small farmers' food grain (maize in 
particular) production capacities through the spread of hybrid maize and agro-chemical 
technologies, applying the accumulated research and extension experiences gained from 
Zimbabwe's ,rbi-modalism", and encouraged by SADCC's "food-security" programmes 
on research, storage and training. Complementarities in SADCC agricultural 
production orientation and trade are yet to emerge, perhaps after this phase of 
experience emulation centred on Zimbabwean coordination and general infrastructure 
expansion. 
All these countries face, however, some form of a wage-price determination and 
unemployment crises related to the low value of small farmer food production, low 
labour absorption of their crops and a low farm-wage structure based on cheap mining 
and industrial labour rates, characteristic of the major urban centres in the region as 
well as on the low absolute value of administered wage-goods markets. This reflects the 
historical fact that the large-scale commercial farming sectors of Zimbabwe and South 
Africa have grown from "protected infancy: through large inputs and financial subsidies 
- not recommended for the SADCC countries by financiers - into a resource-favoured 
high-value commodity producing sub-sector. 
The lesson here may therefore be that "bi-modalism" may only prosper with a fair degree 
of subsidies especially of large farms, as these may "exit" (sell-out) with gain, as well as 
through some degree of market protection as sub-sectoral "cannibalism" among 
commonly produced commodities (e.g. maize in the 1930s and small grains and cotton 
after 1985 in Zimbabwe) is easily realised. But which nation does not subsidise or 
protect agriculture in this world? It is a matter of which categories of farmers or 
agro-industry and services gains. Can the political muscle of SADCC be applied to a 
revision of structural adjustment policy frameworks in the interest of agrarian 
"bi-modalism"? A dilemma exists on how to retain a small profitable large-scale farming 
sector and viable peasants without subsidies. 
The nature of the South African liberation question, the economy, state, class 
configurations and forces, the current geo-political and global pressures have both 
specific and general features, which make it meaningless to abstract from Zimbabwe 
any specific lessons. The general and specific issues are to be settled by those actively 
engaged in liberating that country and as an outcome of their collective struggles and 
dialogue. It is for them to read the nature of those experiences, especially that of 
Zimbabwe, and to apply this to their concrete liberatory praxis, not for others to proffer 
lessons. 
My own view of the global imperialist strategy is that it aims at weaning the mounting 
and organised struggle of the movement, through a deal which may provide access to 
state control and black equal participation in the economy, including the spread of 
incentives to "smallholders" and some black large-scale commercial farmers, but without 
denting the structural pattern of ownership, nor the basic capitalist logic of that economy 
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- with an elaboration of the agricultural supply-side for world markets and sustainably 
cheap food and related wage-goods. 
The rationale for this kind of approach is to sustain the strategic mineral supplies and 
to magnify the Southern African markets targeted by TNCs based in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. South African agriculture has a regional role that has always been attractive 
even if not competitive in terms of its subsidisation vis-a-vis other countries. But the 
land question there may be the crux of any political settlement, even if it temporarily 
requires greater agricultural trade with the rest of SADCC. 
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